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Abstract
There is a multitude of empirical research attempting to measure the effects of foreign
direct investment, including the extent of spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms.
However, the mechanisms through which these spillovers occur have not received as
much attention. One of the potential channels for spillovers of technological, marketing or
managerial knowledge from foreign owned to purely domestic firms is labour mobility.
Workers may benefit from such a spillover process if they manage to appropriate part of
the return to the knowledge of the foreign owned firm. The ability to transfer knowledge
and thereby benefit from it may depend on the skill level of an employee. This paper uses
Finnish linked employer-employee panel data to analyse the extent to which employees
benefit from knowledge they acquire in foreign owned firms and whether educational
background makes a difference in this process. The possibility that employees may pay for
the accumulation of this knowledge, as well as the potential for “reverse spillovers” i.e.
knowledge diffusion from domestic to foreign owned firms are also considered. The
estimates indicate that highly educated employees earn a return to prior experience in a
foreign owned firm, over and above the return to other previous experience. These
workers do not appear to pay for the accumulation of knowledge in the form of lower
wages. The results do not indicate that foreign owned firms pay a premium for knowledge
that workers bring with them from domestic firms.
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1 Introduction 
 
Spillover effects from foreign owned to domestic firms have been cited as one of the 
reasons behind recent policies designed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Foreign owned firms are claimed to have superior technological, marketing or 
managerial knowledge that may spill over to purely domestic firms. Potential channels 
for these spillovers include i) backward and forward linkages between foreign owned and 
domestic firms, ii) demonstration effects and iii) labour mobility. (Blomström and 
Kokko, 1998). Although there is a multitude of empirical research attempting to verify 
the magnitude of benefits of FDI, including the extent of spillovers from foreign to 
domestic firms, the mechanisms through which these spillovers occur have not received 
as much attention.  
 
Spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms have mostly been studied by examining 
the effect of the presence of a multinational company in an industry on the productivity 
of domestic firms.  Most studies do not explicitly study the channels for these spillovers, 
and the evidence on the productivity effects of the presence of a multinational company 
is not conclusive (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). The studies that do consider the 
mechanisms through which spillovers occur, focus mainly on backward and forward 
linkages between firms (e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Also in these studies the evidence on productivity spillovers is mixed. 
 
Labour mobility as a channel for spillovers has hardly been studied, but recently there 
has been increased interest in the subject. Employees could be a source of spillovers if 
they acquire superior knowledge at a foreign owned firm and bring this knowledge with 
them to benefit their new employer when they change jobs. Recent papers by Görg and 
Strobl (2005) and Balsvik (2006) study spillover effects through labour mobility in 
Ghana and Norway respectively. Both find positive productivity effects when employees 
move from multinational firms to domestic firms in the same industry1.  
 
If employees at foreign owned firms accumulate knowledge that purely domestic firms 
do not possess but deem to be valuable, domestic firms may have an incentive to pay 
higher wages in order to attract these employees and obtain access to this knowledge. 
                                                 
1 Görg and Strobl (2005) only consider employees who set up their own firm after leaving the 
multinational. 
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Higher earnings for employees with experience at a foreign owned firm would indicate 
that employees obtain a private return to knowledge accumulation or training in the 
foreign owned firm. If such a private return exists, models of human capital accumulation 
would imply that employees should pay for the opportunity to gain access to this 
knowledge, e.g. in the form of lower wages. In addition, transfer of technological or 
managerial knowledge between firms may require a certain skill level of the employee 
changing firms, which suggests that experience gained in a foreign owned firm may have 
different implications for highly educated individuals than for those with less education. 
 
Martins (2005) and Balsvik (2006) find that employees with experience in multinational 
firms earn higher wages than their co-workers. Martins (2005), however, observes 
employees on average taking a pay cut, when moving from a foreign to a domestic firm, 
whereas Balsvik documents a pay rise upon mobility. Whether or not experience in 
foreign owned firms has a differing effect on employees with different educational 
backgrounds has, to the best of our knowledge, not been studied. When considering 
knowledge transfer from foreign owned to domestic firms through labour mobility, skill 
level can, however, be important. The issue of employees paying for the opportunity to 
accumulate knowledge in foreign owned firms has also not received attention.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the mobility of employees between foreign and 
domestic firms and to examine whether employees are able to appropriate rents accruing 
to the potentially superior knowledge that foreign owned firms possess. In particular, the 
focus is on distinguishing between the effects of experience in foreign owned firms on 
the earnings of employees with high and low education. In addition, employees’ earnings 
when they begin working at a foreign owned firm are studied to determine whether they 
are paying for this knowledge in the form of lower wages. Furthermore, spillovers can 
also occur from domestic to foreign firms, which could be the case e.g. if FDI were 
technology sourcing2. To take into this into account, both mobility from foreign to 
domestic and from domestic to foreign firms are studied.  
 
The analysis is based on linked employer-employee panel data from Statistics Finland. 
The extensive data set consists of information on Finnish firms and workers in both 
services and manufacturing, and covers the period 1994 - 2002. Prior experience in a 
                                                 
2 Driffield and Love (2003) study panel data on UK industries and find that such “reverse spillovers” exist. 
They do not, however, consider the mechanisms through which these spillovers arise.  
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foreign owned firm has a positive effect on earnings of the university educated, over and 
above the effect of other previous experience. These employees do not appear to pay in 
the form of lower wages for the knowledge they accumulate at foreign owned firms. 
Robust evidence of an additional return to experience gained in domestic firms for 
workers moving to foreign firms is not found. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview 
of the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Section 4 outlines the empirical specification and presents the estimation 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2 Related literature 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
 
Spillovers occur when domestic firms benefit from knowledge diffusing from foreign 
firms, and the foreign firms are not able to capture the full return to their knowledge. If 
knowledge is transferred from foreign to domestic firms through labour mobility, the 
extent of the spillover or externality is defined by the division of the costs and benefits of 
knowledge accumulation between the foreign owned firm, its employees, and the firms 
these employees move to.  In addition to recent models of spillovers through labour 
mobility between multinational and domestic firms, this type of phenomenon can be 
thought of in the context of models of R&D spillovers and models of on-the-job training.   
 
Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) develop models of spillovers from 
multinationals to domestic firms through labour mobility. The models imply a trade-off 
between technological and pecuniary spillovers to the local economy. The trade-off 
arises through the multinational firm’s choice between allowing technology transfer and 
preventing it by paying the worker a premium. Models of R&D spillovers through 
worker mobility, such as those of Pakes and Nitzan (1983), Gersbach and Schmutzler 
(2003) and Franco and Filson (2006), are similar in spirit and also provide a framework 
for thinking of spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms. These models 
incorporate the fact that employees gain access to valuable knowledge, which may 
benefit them later in their career. On-the-job training models should also be considered in 
this context, as e.g. Rosen’s (1972) model, where firms differ in terms of their on-the-job 
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training opportunities, provides hypotheses concerning the effect of human capital 
accumulation on earnings at different career stages.  
 
There are several interesting hypotheses that arise from the theoretical framework 
described above. Firstly, if workers accumulate productivity enhancing transferable 
knowledge at the foreign owned firm, they would be expected to earn a return on this 
when moving to a domestic firm. This return will obviously depend on the extent to 
which wages are related to the marginal productivity of the worker. To the extent that 
wages are related to marginal productivity, returns to job mobility between foreign and 
domestic firms will also be indicative of productivity spillovers. With wage increases 
essentially having to be paid out of benefits from increased productivity, estimates of 
wage effects will provide a lower bound for potential productivity effects. 
 
Secondly, in the context of knowledge accumulation in foreign owned firms and mobility 
from foreign to domestic firms, the models mentioned above imply that employees 
accept lower wages when they begin working for a foreign owned firm in order to get the 
opportunity to accumulate valuable knowledge that is not available in domestic firms.  
Once they have accumulated knowledge their earnings will have to increase 
corresponding to their value to other firms, but also as discussed in Rosen (1972), 
because there are less learning opportunities available in the foreign firm that the 
employees would be willing to pay for in the form of lower wages.  
 
Thirdly, models of human capital accumulation, such as the Rosen (1972) model, 
incorporate the possibility that formal schooling may influence learning capacity and 
thereby the incentives for knowledge accumulation. Schooling may also be a relevant 
factor in the actual transfer of knowledge from foreign to domestic firms due to the type 
of knowledge that is presumed to be transferred. The literature on knowledge spillovers 
between multinational and domestic firms discusses various forms of knowledge that 
may be transferred, e.g. technological, managerial or marketing knowledge (Bellak, 
2004; Markusen, 1995). These forms of knowledge imply that knowledge transfer may 
require a certain skill level of the employee moving from a foreign to a domestic firm.  
 
Finally, the theoretical framework described above is based on workers moving from a 
firm with better possibilities for knowledge accumulation to firms where this knowledge 
is not available. If knowledge diffusion actually takes place from domestic to foreign 
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firms, workers would be expected to benefit from mobility in this direction. The next 
section discusses previous empirical evidence related to these issues.   
2.2 Previous empirical research 
 
Empirical evidence on knowledge spillovers from foreign to domestic firms through 
worker mobility is scarce. Using data from Ghana, Görg and Strobl (2005) study 
productivity of firms run by owners who previously worked at multinational companies. 
As mentioned above, they find positive productivity effects compared to domestic firms 
when workers established a company in the same industry as their previous employer. 
Balsvik (2006) studies Norwegian manufacturing firms, and finds that employees who 
move from multinational to purely domestically owned firms have a positive effect on 
total factor productivity. Employees with experience in multinational firms also earn 
higher wages than their co-workers, but the productivity effect of the increased share of 
workers with experience in multinational firms is larger than the effect that experience in 
multinational firms has on employees’ wages.  
 
Martins (2005) studies knowledge spillovers from foreign owned to domestic firms 
indirectly by examining wages of employees moving from foreign owned to domestic 
firms. He finds that employees with experience in foreign owned firms earn more than 
their colleagues in domestic firms, but that workers still suffer sizeable pay cuts when 
moving from foreign to domestic firms. The results indicate that although there is some 
evidence that labour mobility may be a source of knowledge transfer, there is a great deal 
of mobility from foreign to domestic firms that is not consistent with this idea. Malchow-
Møller et al. (2007) also study a similar issue by considering the effect of experience in 
large vs. small plants arguing that multinationals and large firms share relevant 
characteristics. They find that employees with prior experience in large plants earn a 
wage premium.  
 
Positive productivity spillovers could also imply that wages increase across the board in 
domestic firms, i.e. the wage effect is not restricted to the worker moving from a foreign 
owned to a domestic firm. Such an effect could also be observed without actual 
spillovers, if foreign firms pay higher wages on average and domestic firms competing in 
the same labour market have to pay higher wages to attract workers as a consequence of 
this. In a study using cross section data, Aitken et al. (1996) find evidence that the 
presence of foreign owned firms leads to positive wage spillovers to domestic firms in 
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the US, but in Mexico and Venezuela such spillovers are not found. Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2004) also use cross section data and find that a foreign presence in a sector has a 
positive effect on wages in domestic firms in that sector. Girma et al. (2001) use British 
panel data and find no effect of a foreign presence on wage levels in domestic firms. 
They do, however, find some evidence of a negative effect on wage growth. Andrews et 
al. (2007) study the wage effects of foreign ownership and find evidence that workers 
who leave domestic plants to join foreign owned plants gain increases in wages, whereas 
workers moving from foreign owned to domestic firms do not experience a significant 
wage change, implying that the wage effects of foreign ownership spill over into the 
domestic economy. 
 
In the general context of knowledge transfers, spillovers from foreign owned to domestic 
firms are also related to R&D spillovers. Empirical evidence on R&D spillovers through 
labour mobility is provided by, among others, Almeida and Kogut (1999) who study the 
mobility of patent holders between firms. They find that labour mobility does influence 
the transfer of knowledge and that the flow of knowledge seems to be embedded in 
regional labour networks. Møen (2005) studies R&D spillovers empirically in a human 
capital framework. He shows that workers pay for the possibility to accumulate 
knowledge in R&D intensive firms by accepting lower wages early in their career. The 
return to these implicit investments is obtained later on, when wage increases reflect the 
increased value of their knowledge. Møen points out that these results indicate that 
markets, to some extent, internalize the potential externalities created by labour mobility. 
 
Considering experience accumulated at a foreign owned firm from the point of view of 
on-the-job training, relevant empirical research indicates that a large share of employer 
provided training is general and transferable (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999) and that 
employees do not directly nor indirectly pay for the training they receive (Lynch, 1992; 
Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Barron et al., 1999). Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) 
find, in addition, that completed spells of general training provided by a previous 
employer have a larger effect on earnings than completed spells of general training 
provided by the current employer.  
 
The empirical evidence cited above indicates that labour mobility may be a channel for 
knowledge diffusion, and in some cases employees appear to benefit from the knowledge 
transfer process in terms of higher earnings. Evidence on knowledge diffusion from 
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foreign owned to domestic firms and the extent to which employees are able to 
appropriate rents to this knowledge is, however, limited.  
3 Data 
 
This study uses a data set from Statistics Finland that links information on employers, i.e. 
firms and plants, and their employees. The data set is formed by linking data from 
various Statistics Finland databases: Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, 
Business Register, Industrial Statistics, Financial Statements Statistics. The data set is 
based on a 1/3 sample of individuals that were 16 to 69 years old in 1990. They are 
followed to year 2002 and the sample is extended each year by adding a 1/3 sample of 16 
year old persons. The data set contains extensive information on individuals’ 
characteristics including details on education, family, labour market situation, income 
and so forth. The firm and plant level variables include information on industry, 
ownership, economic activity etc. Information on the employer is linked to each 
individual based on the employer at the end of the year. Because of confidentiality, some 
of the firm level information is in the form of classified variables (e.g. size classes), 
growth rates (e.g. employment growth), plant averages (e.g. average age of employees), 
or binary variables (e.g. ownership status). These data are collected for all available years 
on all firms and plants that employ at least one individual in the sample.  
 
Information on foreign ownership is available from 1994 onwards, which is not a severe 
restriction considering that foreign ownership in Finland was scarce before this time due 
to strict regulations that were not abolished until 1992 (Golub, 2003). The data set used 
in this study extends from 1994 to 2002 and includes individuals who can be linked to a 
plant in every year following their first appearance in the data. This basically restricts the 
sample to the private sector. To enable the analysis of mobility, only individuals who can 
be followed for at least three years are included. The data set thus consists of 198 266 
individuals who work in 80 216 different plants, which amounts to a total of 1 899 870 
person year observations.  
 
In addition, the sample is restricted to include only individuals who are employed at least 
six months every year from the time they are first included in the sample. This implies 
that the included individuals have a reasonably strong attachment to the labour market 
and may help to avoid confounding effects of elongated spells of non-employment with 
the effects of different types of work experience. The effects of experience in foreign 
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owned firms on labour market outcomes other than earnings would, of course, be an 
interesting topic in itself but is beyond the scope of this paper. 95 percent of the included 
individuals are employed for 12 months every year, which roughly ensures that job 
moves are voluntary, as discussed in Manning (2003). Since the objective is to study 
mobility from foreign to domestic firms as a source of knowledge spillovers, voluntary 
job moves are the focus of attention.  
 
The data are checked for and cleared of observations with missing ownership indicators 
and discrepancies in other key variables. In addition a lower bound of 500 euros for 
monthly wages is also imposed. Following these amendments the data set consists of 
136408 individuals, of whom approximately 72% are observed in all nine years. These 
individuals work in 49 408 different plants. The total number of person-year observations 
in the restricted sample is 1072 139. 
 
In this study a job is defined as an employee-plant match and job mobility is defined by 
combining information on the start date of employment and information on changes in an 
individual’s plant and firm codes. This combination of information is used to ensure as 
accurate a measure of job mobility as possible and to avoid problems related to renewal 
of employment contracts with the same employer on the one hand and administrative 
changes in plant and firm codes on the other. Basically a worker is classified as having 
changed jobs if he/she has both changed plants and started a new employment contract 
during the year. In addition, this measure of job mobility is corrected so that if a worker’s 
firm code does not change, i.e. if the worker moves from one plant to another in the same 
firm, he/she is not classified as a mover. Plant codes are used as the basis of identifying 
job mobility because they have been found to be more stable and less subject to 
administrative changes than firm codes in this data set. The adjustment using information 
on continuous employment contracts and unchanged firm codes should minimize the 
classification of plant changes within the same company as job changes. Obviously a 
worker could have changed jobs several times during the year, but the data enable only 
the determination of the start date of the latest employment contract, and the plant and 
firm codes are based on the last week of the year. 
 
Foreign ownership is defined on the basis of ultimate beneficiary owner (UBO) and a 20 
% threshold is used in classifying a plant as foreign owned. It has been suggested in the 
literature, that the focus should actually be on the comparison of multinational and non-
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multinational firms, rather than foreign owned and domestic firms (e.g. Bellak, 2004). 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable indicator of multinational status in the data set for this 
period, so the analysis will be based on comparing foreign owned and domestic owned 
firms.   
 
Table 1 shows the number of employees in foreign and domestic plants annually. The 
steady rise in the share of employees working in foreign owned plants is consistent with 
the increase in foreign ownership following the abolition of restrictions on FDI (see 
Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2004). The mobility of employees between these plants is 
documented in Table 2. Overall mobility is quite low, with the majority of job changes 
occurring between domestic owned plants. There is substantial mobility in 1995 most 
likely related to the aftermath of the severe recession in Finland. Mobility from foreign to 
domestic plants and especially from domestic to foreign plants increases relatively more 
than the total number of job changes, which is in line with the increase in the 
employment share of foreign owned plants.  
 
[Table 1 & Table 2 here] 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study how experience in foreign owned firms affects 
earnings in subsequent jobs. It may of course be that workers who have experience from 
foreign owned firms and are consequently hired to work for domestic firms differ in 
terms of other characteristics that affect earnings. Tables 3 and 4 show statistics for 
employee characteristics classified based on the nationality of the employee’s current and 
previous employer. Due to the time span of the data, job mobility is only observed if it 
occurs after 1994. Partly for this reason, average tenure is significantly lower for those 
with prior experience at another firm. The average age is lower for those with prior 
experience, which, since only recent job moves are observed, is consistent with evidence 
that job mobility is more common among young workers. Average earnings are highest 
for those who currently work at a foreign owned firm and also have prior experience in a 
foreign owned firm. Based on these raw averages foreign ownership of the current firm 
is, however, not the only meaningful characteristic, as employees with experience from 
foreign firms who currently work at a domestic firm do not earn less on average than 
employees in foreign firms with prior experience only from domestic firms.  As to 
education, foreign firms appear to recruit more educated workers. Both employees 
currently working at foreign firms and employees with experience in foreign firms are on 
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average more educated than employees with no previous experience or experience from 
only domestic firms.  
 
[Table 3 & Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 documents changes in earnings following a job change. Employees seem to gain 
on average both from moving from a foreign to a domestic firm and from moving 
between domestic firms. The average wage gain is actually higher in relative terms for 
job changes between domestic firms, but the average real wage remains lower than that 
of employees who move from a foreign to another foreign or to a domestic firm.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
4 Estimation 
 
To test the various hypotheses outlined in Section 2, we estimate wage equations for 
workers in domestic and foreign firms, and control for experience in different types of 
firms. This enables us to determine whether the return to previous experience in foreign 
owned firms differs from previous experience in purely domestic firms and whether there 
is a difference depending on what type of firm the worker moves to. We also take into 
account the fact that the effects may differ between employees with different educational 
backgrounds and seek to identify these potential differences. In addition, we analyse 
employees’ earnings development in foreign owned firms to determine whether they pay 
for the opportunity to gain access to foreign owned firms’ knowledge. Finally, we 
attempt to tackle the problem of potentially endogenous mobility and check the 
robustness of the results to the use of different specifications. 
4.1 Empirical Specification 
 
In order to examine the possibility that workers moving between foreign and domestic 
firms appropriate returns to knowledge acquired at their previous employer, earnings are 
regressed on measures of tenure at the previous job as well as interactions of this tenure 
with the nationality (domestic or foreign) of both their previous and current employer.  In 
addition, to determine whether employees pay for the chance to gain experience at a 
foreign owned firm by accepting lower wages when they begin working there, the 
nationality of the current employer is controlled for, as well as its interaction with tenure 
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at the current employer. A large set of control variables is also included.  The earnings 
effects of tenure at both the previous and current job are estimated as splines. In its 
simplest form, without the interaction terms, the specification can be written as: 
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where ln wit is the log real monthly wage, Xit includes personal characteristics and firm 
characteristics, 1(·) denotes an indicator function, μi is a person specific fixed effect and 
γt is a time effect. The spline for current tenure has changing slopes at 2, 5 and 10 years 
of tenure and the spline for tenure at the previous employer has changing slopes at 2 and 
5 years of prior tenure3. The interpretation of the coefficients is quite straightforward. 
For example, if β2 is positive, earnings increase during the first years on a job. If β3 is 
higher than β2, the returns to tenure increase after the first two years and if β3 is lower 
than β2, the returns to tenure decrease after two years.  
 
To determine whether workers earn a return to knowledge they accumulate at foreign 
owned firms, the variables measuring tenure at the previous employer are interacted with 
an indicator of foreign ownership of this previous employer. However, as discussed 
above, there is also the possibility of reverse spillovers, i.e. knowledge transfer from 
domestic to foreign firms, so this is controlled for by interacting previous tenure with an 
indicator of foreign ownership of the current firm (the firm that the employee moves to). 
Finally, to distinguish the effects mentioned above from effects of mobility between 
foreign owned firms, there is also an interaction of previous tenure with an indicator of 
foreign ownership of both the current and previous firm. This last interaction will capture 
returns to previous tenure for employees moving between foreign owned firms. To 
capture the possibility that workers accept lower wages in exchange for the opportunity 
                                                 
3 With the data covering the years 1994 to 2002, the maximum amount of tenure at a previous employer is 
8 years. 
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to accumulate knowledge at a foreign owned firm, tenure at the current firm is interacted 
with a dummy indicating foreign ownership of the current firm.  
 
Work experience prior to the period for which data is available (1994) can not be 
determined, but age and education are used to control for potential work experience. 
Gender is also controlled for in all estimations. Plant level control variables include sales 
per employee, firm size, region, industry and an indicator of foreign ownership. In 
addition, an indicator is included for whether the firm that the individual worked for in 
the previous year reduced employment by 40% or more, and similarly for this period’s 
employer. This aims to control for potentially involuntary job mobility. As discussed in 
Section 2, knowledge transfer may predominantly be related to mobility of the more 
educated. Therefore, model (1) is also estimated with interaction terms between 
university education and different types of experience. 
 
Accumulated experience (both in domestic and foreign firms) may be correlated with 
individual characteristics that the employers are able to identify, but that are not available 
in the data. In addition, workers with experience from foreign owned firms may be 
different from workers with experience only in domestic firms e.g. if foreign firms have a 
more efficient screening process for new recruits. As the data set is a panel, the 
estimation can be done using individual fixed effects to control for these unobserved 
characteristics.4 There is, however, also the potential problem of endogeneity of the 
foreign-domestic status of the firms which could arise e.g. if foreign firms only acquired 
the best performing firms in Finland which may also pay higher wages. Due to the 
number of plants in the data set, estimating the model with both person and plant fixed 
effects is not currently feasible for us using standard software such as Stata and SAS. 
However, we apply a recently developed programme enabling the inclusion of a large 
number of dummy variables5 to a subset of the data to control for plant effects. 
 
It is also important to note that there may be some process whereby job mobility in itself 
is a way of achieving higher earnings, as detailed in the job mobility literature (e.g. 
                                                 
4 The amount of previous experience is constant within each job spell and changes each time an individual 
changes jobs. Therefore, only individuals who have changed jobs have previous experience and these 
individuals are observed before and after the job change, so the effect of previous experience is identified 
also in the fixed effects estimation.  
5 The estimations are done using a Stata implementation of memory saving estimation of the fixed effects 
least squares dummy variable regression (felsdvreg) developed by Thomas Cornelißen. The method is 
described in Cornelißen (2006). 
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Manning, 2003). Therefore, prior experience may be endogenous in the earnings 
equation, as the potential for achieving a higher wage is likely to be one of the 
determinants of job mobility. To control for this, we would need an instrument for 
previous experience, and this is unfortunately currently unavailable. Controlling for plant 
fixed effects in addition to person fixed effects should alleviate the problem somewhat, 
and we also attempt to control for endogenous job mobility by using displaced workers. 
Various robustness checks are also done to check that the chosen functional form and the 
experience measure used are not driving the results. Details are in the next section. To 
take into account the fact that the data set is a panel and observations for a given 
individual in consecutive years are unlikely to be independent, we use robust standard 
errors that allow for correlation among observations for an individual in different years.  
4.2 Estimation results 
 
4.2.1 Returns to previous experience 
 
The results for the estimation of model (1) with interaction terms added are presented in 
Table 6. The first column shows the results of an OLS regression.  In the first section of 
the table the coefficients on previous tenure imply a return of about 5% to the first years 
of tenure accumulated at the previous employer with lower returns of about 1% to 
previous tenure exceeding two years. Because the estimation includes interactions of 
previous tenure with previous and current employers’ nationalities, the coefficient on 
previous tenure alone indicates returns to previous tenure for employees moving between 
domestically owned firms. The interaction of tenure at the previous employer with the 
nationality of that employer implies that there is an additional return of just under 4% for 
the first two years of tenure at a foreign firm if a worker subsequently moves to a 
domestic firm, with an even higher additional return to previous tenure if both the 
previous and current employers are foreign. However, as noted above, there may be 
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the measure of accumulated 
experience which may affect these results. To eliminate the unobserved effects, model 
(1) is estimated using individual fixed effects. The results of this estimation are presented 
in column (2) of Table 6. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
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The fixed effects estimates indicate an even higher return to previous tenure for 
employees moving between domestic firms and an additional positive effect of 2.5% per 
year for the first two years of tenure from a foreign firm. There is also an additional 
positive effect for those moving to foreign firms. In all these cases the effects beyond two 
years of previous tenure are not significant. These results could be interpreted in the 
context of the Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) model, where employees do not realize 
the full return to training until they change jobs. Balsvik also finds broadly similar results 
for Norwegian manufacturing, although in her case there is no additional return to 
previous tenure at a domestic firm for employees moving to multinational firms. The 
results may, however, be an indication of endogenous job mobility, as described above. 
We return to this issue later.  First, we redo the estimations taking into account the 
educational background of the employees who change jobs, and find that the results 
above are altered.  
 
It was argued above that if there are knowledge spillovers from foreign owned to 
domestic firms through worker mobility, they may be predominantly the result of 
educated workers changing firms. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show results for 
estimation of the same OLS and fixed effects models respectively, but including 
interactions between the experience variables and a dummy for having completed a 
university degree. Focusing on the fixed effects estimates in column (4), previous tenure 
again has a positive and significant effect on earnings for all employees, but there is no 
difference between the returns to previous tenure at foreign and domestic firms, apart 
from a negative effect of more than 2 years of previous tenure for employees moving 
between foreign firms. University education affects the return to previous tenure by 
increasing the return to the first couple of years of previous tenure, but this additional 
return decreases somewhat for previous tenure exceeding two years.  
 
The actual coefficients of interest are, however, those on the interactions between the 
nationality of the previous employer and tenure at that employer for workers with a 
university education. For the university educated there is an additional return of 
approximately 3% to the first years of previous tenure at a foreign firm. The additional 
effects of previous tenure for university educated employees moving from domestic to 
foreign or from foreign to foreign firms do not differ from the effects of previous tenure 
for educated workers moving between domestic firms. This would imply that there is 
something different about mobility of educated workers from foreign to domestic firms, 
 14
compared to other types of mobility. This finding is interesting in various respects. 
Firstly, this type of result is consistent with the view that knowledge transfer depends on 
the skill level of the employee. Secondly, the fact that it is mobility from foreign to 
domestic firms and not in the opposite direction that appears to be beneficial in terms of 
earnings, implies that it is experience that educated employees acquire in foreign forms 
that is valued in domestic firms and not vice versa. This is consistent with evidence that 
foreign owned firms outperform purely domestic firms (e.g. Bellak, 2004; Ilmakunnas 
and Maliranta, 2004 for Finland).  
 
As mentioned above the positive earnings effects of previous tenure can be related to 
endogenous job mobility. To some extent this problem may be alleviated by the inclusion 
of plant fixed effects in addition to person fixed effects, but the software restrictions 
discussed earlier prohibit including plant dummies for the entire data set. However, we 
are able to redo the estimations including plant fixed effects for a reasonably sized 
subsample of the data. As previous experience in foreign owned firms appears to 
primarily have an effect on the earnings of the highly educated, we restrict the estimation 
to those with a university education. As this does not reduce the number of plants 
sufficiently, we further restrict the analysis to manufacturing plants. This leaves us with 
18 080 individuals who are employed in 4359 different plants, giving a total 108 191 
person years. Estimating model (1) for this group including plant fixed effects and 
interactions of the tenure variables with nationality of the previous and current employer 
gives results that are consistent with those reported above6, implying that the plant level 
controls we included in our earlier estimations work reasonably well in controlling for 
differences between plants. Further ways of alleviating the problem of endogenous job 
mobility will be discussed later. 
4.2.2 Do workers pay for knowledge accumulation? 
 
If employees are able to reap returns to the knowledge they accumulate in foreign owned 
firms, the models of R&D spillovers and on-the-job training mentioned above imply that 
this should show up in the form of lower wages while working (or starting to work) for 
the foreign firm. Looking at the fixed effects results in column (2) of Table 6, the 
coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy for the current employer is not statistically 
significant, and the returns to tenure actually appear to be slightly higher in foreign than 
                                                 
6 Results not shown, available on request. 
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in domestic firms. This is also the case when adding the interactions with university 
education to the fixed effects estimation (column 4), with the returns to tenure for the 
university educated in foreign owned firms being higher than for those in domestic firms 
and also higher than the returns to tenure of other employees in foreign owned firms7. 
Employees do, therefore, not appear to pay in the form of lower earnings for the 
possibility to accumulate knowledge at foreign owned firms. This indicates that in 
addition to a return to prior experience in foreign owned firms, educated workers also 
appear to earn a return to the knowledge they have accumulated already when working at 
the foreign owned firm. This would be in line with the theoretical framework described 
earlier, where wages increase to reflect the accumulation of valuable knowledge. 
 
The small foreign ownership effect is consistent with recent evidence that the foreign 
ownership wage premium often found in studies may be due to poor data and methods 
(e.g. Martins, 2006 and Heyman et al., 2004.). Proper estimation of this effect would 
require further refinements here as well. The fact that there does not appear to be a pure 
foreign ownership affect but the returns to tenure for the university educated in foreign 
owned firms appear higher than those in domestic firms would also imply that it is the 
accumulation of some sort of human capital in foreign owned firms that is the key 
element. 
 
To analyse in more detail whether employees accept wage discounts when entering 
foreign firms, we also conduct the estimation using data on a single cohort of university 
graduates. Earnings equations for the years 1994 to 2002 are estimated for individuals 
who obtained a university degree in 19938, i.e. their initial years in the labour market are 
documented in full. No wage discount when entering foreign owned firms is, however, 
observed.  
4.2.3 Returns to previous experience for displaced workers 
 
The results above indicate that employees may accumulate knowledge that is not 
available in domestic firms when working at a foreign firm and be able to appropriate 
some of the return on this knowledge when moving to a domestic firm. As noted above, 
however, there may be some process whereby job mobility in itself is a way of achieving 
                                                 
7 This is in line with Huttunen’s (2007) finding that following foreign acquisition wages rise more rapidly 
for highly educated than less educated employees. 
8 Only those who were under 30 years old in 1993 are included in order to ensure as well as possible that 
they are actually entering the labour for the first time. 
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higher earnings. This would mean that prior experience is endogenous in the earnings 
equation and could be one explanation behind the positive wage effects for prior 
experience documented above. Controlling for plant fixed effects, as was done above, 
can reduce the problem to some extent, but to properly control for endogenous mobility 
we would need an instrument for previous experience, and this is unfortunately currently 
unavailable9.  
 
In order to try to correct for the possible endogeneity we do, however, estimate wage 
equations for individuals who either stay at their job during the whole observation period 
or move to a new job only in connection with a significant (greater than or equal to 40%) 
reduction in their employer plant’s labour force. So the “stayers” work in a foreign or 
domestic firm continuously, and the “movers” leave their employer for a new job at 
another firm. Significant employment reduction is one of the definitions of displacement 
used in the literature (e.g. Bender et al., 2002) and is designed to include those 
individuals who leave the firm because they foresee the plant closure or are dismissed as 
the firm downsizes prior to closure. The measure may, however, also include employees 
who leave the firm for other reasons. Most of these workers are in any case likely to be 
changing jobs involuntarily, which will control for the bias caused by endogenous 
mobility. However, as we are mostly interested in knowledge transfer and returns to 
knowledge transfer by labour mobility could be argued to primarily materialize when 
firms actively seek employees with useful knowledge, displaced workers may not be 
ideal for studying this issue.  
 
To avoid excluding displaced workers who take some time finding a new job, the sample 
is extended to include employees who are employed for at least one month in each year, 
as opposed to the minimum of six months above. In order to be able to match the 
employees to a plant, all the included individuals are employed at the end of the year. As 
the primary question of interest here is the effect of experience in a foreign owned firm 
on subsequent wages, the sample is restricted to workers who find a new job rapidly after 
leaving their old job, and the effects on the length of unemployment etc. are not studied. 
This is an area for further research. The sample to be used in estimation includes a total 
of 1 128 961 person year observations with 143 178 workers who do not change jobs and 
                                                 
9 Abowd et al. (2006) study mobility and wages using linked employer-employee data and use two kinds of 
exclusion variables in the mobility equation: one related to individual heterogeneity with respect to 
previous employment spells and the other describing the position of the worker in the age distribution at 
entry to the firm. Unfortunately, similar exclusion restrictions are not available for our analysis.  
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3 732 workers who change jobs in connection with a significant ( ≥ 40%) reduction in 
employment at their plant. 361 of the workers who change jobs leave a foreign firm. We 
estimate the same specification as above for the original data set with the splines for 
current and previous tenure structured in the same way. Here, however, previous tenure 
will only be greater than zero for employees who leave their job in connection with plant 
downsizing. 
 
The results are shown in Table 7, where column (1) displays the OLS estimates and 
column (2) the estimates including individual fixed effects. Even for this group of 
workers, the first few years of tenure at the previous job have a positive and significant 
effect on earnings. Previous tenure above two years does not have a statistically 
significant effect, and the return to previous tenure does not differ between employees 
moving between firms with different ownership. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 show 
results of OLS and fixed effects estimations respectively including interaction terms 
between the variables measuring previous experience and a dummy for having obtained a 
university degree. With this specification, previous tenure at a foreign firm has an 
additional positive effect on earnings of approximately 5% as compared to employees 
with prior experience from a domestic firm, but this effect does not differ for different 
education groups like in our earlier estimations. Similar to the earlier estimations, a 
university degree implies an additional positive effect of previous experience on 
earnings. The low number of individuals who change jobs may affect the precision of the 
results, but these findings indicate that the positive effect of previous experience 
observed in our earlier estimations is not purely due to endogenous job mobility, and 
there appear to be some returns to accumulated knowledge that are not realised until 
changing jobs.  
 
Off the topic of endogenous job mobility, the results in column (4) of Table 7 indicate 
that for this group of workers there is an initial foreign ownership wage premium for 
employees without a university education, but that this effect decreases during the first 
years on the job. On the other hand, for university educated employees there is hardly 
any initial earnings effect (taking into account the direct effect and the interaction with 
the education dummy), but the returns to tenure in the first years are higher than for 
employees in domestic firms. These results may, obviously, be influenced by the 
construction of the sample.  
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4.2.4 Robustness checks 
 
This section analyses the robustness of the results presented above to the use of different 
specifications. First, in order to examine the effect of the choice of experience measure 
and functional form of the empirical specification on the results, we consider alternatives 
for both10. The first modification uses a cubic in previous and current tenure instead of 
estimating the effects as splines.  The results are consistent with those above. In addition, 
an experience measure incorporating previous experience from not only one employer 
but all previous employers observed after 1994 is used. The results are, again, similar to 
those above, which may be expected as we are only able to use data from 1994 onwards. 
This polynomial regression is also run using an experience measure incorporating both 
previous experience and current tenure, i.e. tenure is included both in the experience 
variable and as a separate regressor. This commonly used form of the wage regression 
also yields results consistent with those above. Finally, to take into account the fact that 
the distribution of previous tenure is restricted by experience only being measured from 
1994 onwards, the model was also estimated from 1998 onwards using experience data 
starting in 1994. The results are also robust to this change.  
5 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether workers are able to appropriate rents 
to the potentially superior knowledge possessed by foreign owned firms when moving to 
a domestic firm and, in particular, whether this is related to different educational 
backgrounds of the workers. The analysis shows that previous tenure in a foreign owned 
firm has a positive effect on earnings of the university educated, over and above the 
effect of other previous experience. These findings are consistent with models of 
knowledge diffusion through labour mobility, where a domestic firm may bid for a 
worker at a foreign owned firm in order to gain access to her knowledge. The results are 
also in line with the view that if there is knowledge transfer from foreign owned to 
domestic firms it may require a certain skill level of the employee changing jobs.  
 
The results indicate that workers do not pay in the form of lower wages for the 
knowledge they accumulate at foreign owned firms, and that educated workers appear to 
earn a return to the knowledge they have accumulated already when working at the 
foreign owned firm. These findings are in line with models of human capital 
                                                 
10 Results not shown, available on request.  
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accumulation. Further research on the development of employees’ productivity both 
during and after working for a foreign firm is needed in order to assess how the returns to 
the potentially superior knowledge in foreign owned firms are actually distributed.  
 
An important issue to keep in mind in this type of study is the problem of potentially 
endogenous job mobility. When attempting to control for this by studying the earnings of 
workers who leave their job in a time of significant employment reduction, the results 
indicate that workers do earn a return to knowledge accumulated at previous jobs even 
when they change jobs involuntarily. The results for this sample of workers indicate an 
additional positive effect of experience in a foreign owned firm on average, with no 
difference for the university educated. If employees with experience at foreign owned 
firms have accumulated valuable knowledge, this may also show up in other labour 
market outcomes, e.g. employment probabilities. Studying these effects is therefore a 
natural extension of the current study.  
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Domestic
% of all 
employees Foreign
% of all 
employees Total
1994 88 208 91 % 8 689 9 % 96 897
1995 91 858 91 % 9 570 9 % 101 428
1996 95 039 89 % 11 187 11 % 106 226
1997 99 451 89 % 12 876 11 % 112 327
1998 103 871 87 % 15 410 13 % 119 281
1999 108 296 85 % 18 460 15 % 126 756
2000 114 826 84 % 21 582 16 % 136 408
2001 113 283 83 % 23 125 17 % 136 408
2002 111 854 82 % 24 554 18 % 136 408
Total 926 686 86 % 145 453 14 % 1 072 139
Tables 
 
Table 1 Employees by firm ownership 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 Number of job changes by firm ownership 
From domestic 
to domestic
% of all 
employees
From domestic 
to foreign
% of all 
employees
From foreign to 
domestic
% of all 
employees
From foreign to 
foreign
% of all 
employees
Total % of all 
employees
1995 5302 5.23 % 257 0.25 % 177 0.17 % 71 0.07 % 5807 5.73 %
1996 1928 1.81 % 269 0.25 % 196 0.18 % 82 0.08 % 2475 2.33 %
1997 2435 2.17 % 354 0.32 % 270 0.24 % 130 0.12 % 3189 2.84 %
1998 3186 2.67 % 560 0.47 % 383 0.32 % 151 0.13 % 4280 3.59 %
1999 3459 2.73 % 559 0.44 % 545 0.43 % 229 0.18 % 4792 3.78 %
2000 3514 2.58 % 593 0.43 % 566 0.41 % 253 0.19 % 4926 3.61 %
2001 3946 2.89 % 680 0.50 % 574 0.42 % 254 0.19 % 5454 4.00 %
2002 2519 1.85 % 336 0.25 % 374 0.27 % 142 0.10 % 3371 2.47 %
Total 26289 2.45 % 3608 0.34 % 3085 0.29 % 1312 0.12 % 34294 3.20 %  
  
 
 
Table 3 Characteristics of employees by type of recent work experience 
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 846 491 40.94 10.15
Female 846 484 0.33 0.47
Tenure (years) 843 253 13.08 9.42
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 845 655 2460 1209
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 102 864 37.72 9.59
Female 102 864 0.25 0.43
Tenure (years) 101 841 2.76 2.61
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 102 744 2527 1188
Tenure at previous firm 102 864 1.91 2.17
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 9 643 36.01 8.93
Female 9 643 0.30 0.46
Tenure (years) 9 548 2.13 2.09
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 9 600 3027 1666
Tenure at previous firm 9 643 2.34 2.55
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 12 148 34.39 8.61
Female 12 148 0.31 0.46
Tenure (years) 12 029 2.47 2.96
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 12 126 2895 1522
Tenure at previous firm 12 148 2.26 2.43
Age 4 096 37.33 8.90
Female 4 096 0.32 0.47
Tenure (years) 4 058 2.19 2.40
Real monthly earnings (2002 euros) 4 070 3802 2107
Tenure at previous firm 4 096 2.49 2.87
Previous employer foreign and current employer foreign
No previous experience
Previous employer domestic and current employer domestic
Previous employer foreign and current employer domestic
Previous employer domestic and current employer foreign
 
 
 
 
    
Table 4 Education of employees by type of recent work experience  
Education Frequency Percent
Comprehensive school 225890 26.69
Secondary education 383899 45.35
Bachelor's degree 193300 22.84
Master's or PhD 43402 5.13
Total 846491 100
Education Frequency Percent
Comprehensive school 22988 22.35
Secondary education 48623 47.27
Bachelor's degree 24478 23.80
Master's or PhD 6775 6.59
Total 102864 100
Education Frequency Percent
Comprehensive school 1049 10.88
Secondary education 3574 37.06
Bachelor's degree 3424 35.51
Master's or PhD 1596 16.55
Total 9643 100
Education Frequency Percent
Comprehensive school 1292 10.64
Secondary education 4931 40.59
Bachelor's degree 4295 35.36
Master's or PhD 1630 13.42
Total 12148 100
Education Frequency Percent
Comprehensive school 368 8.98
Secondary education 1161 28.34
Bachelor's degree 1843 45.00
Master's or PhD 724 17.68
Total 4096 100
Previous employer foreign and current employer foreign
No previous experience
Previous employer domestic and current employer domestic
Previous employer foreign and current employer domestic
Previous employer domestic and current employer foreign
 
 
Table 5 Wage changes following job change 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Real monthly earnings before (2002 euros) 26275 2064 1112 3078 2743 1858
Real monthly earnings after (2002 euros) 26275 2480 1341 3078 2855 1693
Change in real monthly earnings 26275 27.3 % 49.6 % 3078 12.9 % 44.2 %
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Real monthly earnings before (2002 euros) 3607 2316 1459 1306 3210 1988
Real monthly earnings after (2002 euros) 3607 2541 1365 1306 3503 2070
Change in real monthly earnings 3607 19.4 % 42.2 % 1306 16.7 % 41.0 %
From domestic to domestic firm From foreign to domestic firm
From domestic to foreign firm From foreign to foreign firm
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Table 6 Wage effects of experience in different types of firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effects of tenure at previous employer for all employees
Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.053 0.091 0.058 0.066
(25.27)** (41.93)** (24.34)** (25.69)**
Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 0.007
(3.69)** (0.430) (1.020) (2.55)*
Previous tenure over 5 years 0.013 0.002 0.015 0.003
(2.44)* (0.440) (2.63)** (0.670)
Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.038 0.025 0.012 0.002
(6.73)** (5.00)** (1.580) (0.360)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.012 0.000 0.024 0.005
(1.540) (0.020) (2.37)* (0.590)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.007 -0.014 0.006 -0.006
(0.390) (1.110) (0.260) (0.370)
Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.006 0.020 -0.014 0.016
(1.020) (4.40)** (2.04)* (1.820)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.009 0.003 0.017 0.005
(1.350) (0.510) (1.960) (0.770)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.006 0.000 0.008 0.002
(0.400) (0.010) (0.410) (0.120)
Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.067 0.018 0.075 0.024
(5.72)** (2.00)* (4.02)** (1.850)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.037 -0.022 -0.055 -0.038
(2.36)* (1.920) (2.41)* (2.46)*
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.021 0.026 0.042 0.040
(0.580) (1.170) (0.820) (1.280)
Effects of tenure at previous employer for the university educated
University education 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years -0.014 0.070
(3.26)** (15.08)**
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.035 -0.024
(6.28)** (4.73)**
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.001 0.002
(0.110) (0.190)
x Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.054 0.029
(4.91)** (2.92)**
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.033 0.003
(2.12)* (0.200)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.004 -0.019
(0.110) (0.730)
x Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.047 -0.017
(4.26)** (1.880)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.026 -0.002
(1.880) (0.170)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.002 0.001
(0.060) (0.040)
x Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years -0.034 -0.015
(1.400) (0.840)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.047 0.035
(1.490) (1.580)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.035 -0.023
(0.480) (0.520)
Table continues on next page  
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Table 6 Continued  
Effects of tenure at current employer for all employees
Current employer foreign -0.019 -0.007 -0.013 -0.009
(2.52)* (1.060) (1.380) (1.120)
Current employer foreign 
x Tenure less than 2 years 0.027 0.007 0.028 -0.005
(6.70)** (2.05)* (5.51)** (1.100)
x Tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.014 0.008 0.012 0.010
(6.83)** (5.28)** (4.96)** (5.52)**
x Tenure between 5 and 10 years -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007
(2.42)* (6.03)** (6.70)** (8.11)**
x Tenure over 10 years -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(4.30)** (3.96)** (2.69)** (2.19)*
Effects of tenure at current employer for the university educated
University education
x Current employer foreign -0.013 0.024
(0.880) (1.930)
x Current employer foreign 
x Tenure less than 2 years -0.004 0.025
(0.580) (4.14)**
x Tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.004 -0.006
(0.950) (2.27)*
x Tenure between 5 and 10 years 0.016 0.007
(6.50)** (4.25)**
x Tenure over 10 years 0.001 -0.003
(0.930) (6.37)**
Person fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 918251 918251 918251 918251
R-squared 0.47 0.18 0.47 0.19
Number of individuals 136389 136389
4. The R-squared reported for models 2 and 4 are for the "within-tranformed" estimation. Corresponding R-squared for these models estimated with 
individual dummy variables are 0.90 for both models.
Notes
1. The dependent variable is log real monthly earnings
2. Coefficients on the following variables are not reported: tenure, age (models 1 and 3), education dummies (models 1 and 3), gender dummy (models 
1 and 3), time dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, dummy for decreasing firm employment, firm size, sales/employee. 
3. Robust t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 7 Wage effects of experience gained prior to displacement 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effects of tenure at previous employer for all employees
Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.034 0.051 0.029 0.035
(6.19)** (7.29)** (4.65)** (4.20)**
Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.013
(1.410) (0.760) (1.870) (1.640)
Previous tenure over 5 years 0.037 0.011 0.017 0.003
(2.97)** (1.100) (1.340) (0.230)
Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.035 0.022 0.043 0.052
(1.770) (1.170) (1.790) (2.35)*
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0 -0.028 -0.026 -0.049
(0.010) (1.340) (0.740) (1.780)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.029 0.022 -0.017 0.006
(0.470) (0.540) (0.220) (0.120)
Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years -0.016 0.007 -0.032 -0.007
(1.100) (0.590) (1.710) (0.430)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.041 0.027 0.033 0.02
(2.28)* (1.720) (1.400) (0.990)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.063 -0.024 -0.018 0.034
(1.510) (0.710) (0.370) (0.870)
Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.012 -0.015 0.018 -0.034
(0.300) (0.410) (0.380) (0.760)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.01 0.016 -0.014 0.029
(0.200) (0.420) (0.250) (0.600)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.017 -0.07 0.027 -0.095
(0.150) (0.960) (0.240) (1.120)
Effects of tenure at previous employer for the university educated
University education 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.014 0.046
(1.220) (3.12)**
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.014 -0.023
(0.960) (1.460)
x Previous tenure over 5 years 0.077 0.041
(2.35)* (1.570)
x Previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years -0.019 -0.08
(0.440) (1.610)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.06 0.062
(1.210) (1.430)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.022 0.025
(0.180) (0.290)
x Current employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years 0.032 0.022
(1.060) (0.870)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.022 0.02
(0.600) (0.640)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.129 -0.169
(1.380) (2.21)*
x Current and previous employer foreign 
x Previous tenure less than 2 years -0.02 0.067
(0.250) (0.900)
x Previous tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.043 -0.039
(0.420) (0.550)
x Previous tenure over 5 years -0.066 0.103
(0.270) (0.680)
Table continues on next page  
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Table 7 Continued 
Effects of tenure at current employer for all employees
Current employer foreign -0.009 0.025 0.001 0.042
(0.760) (2.18)* (0.090) (3.02)**
Current employer foreign 
x Tenure less than 2 years 0.018 -0.018 0.011 -0.031
(2.66)** (2.83)** (1.530) (4.07)**
x Tenure between 2 and 5 years 0.014 0.01 0.016 0.008
(6.52)** (5.93)** (6.28)** (4.38)**
x Tenure between 5 and 10 years -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006
(1.030) (4.44)** (5.91)** (7.12)**
x Tenure over 10 years -0.002 0 -0.001 0.001
(4.97)** (1.460) (3.50)** (3.16)**
Effects of tenure at current employer for the university educated
University education
x Current employer foreign -0.032 -0.046
(1.230) (1.97)*
x Current employer foreign 
x Tenure less than 2 years 0.02 0.039
(1.340) (3.06)**
x Tenure between 2 and 5 years -0.004 0.002
(1.030) (0.760)
x Tenure between 5 and 10 years 0.016 0.008
(6.74)** (5.15)**
x Tenure over 10 years 0.001 -0.002
(1.350) (5.00)**
Person fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 974465 974465 974465 974465
R-squared 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.15
Number of individuals 141648 141648
4. The R-squared reported for models 2 and 4 are for the "within-tranformed" estimation. Corresponding R-squared for these models estimated with 
individual dummy variables are 0.909 for both models.
Notes
1. The dependent variable is log real monthly earnings
2. Coefficients on the following variables are not reported: tenure, age (models 1 and 3), education dummies (models 1 and 3), gender dummy (models 
1 and 3), time dummies, regional dummies, industry dummies, dummy for decreasing firm employment, firm size, sales/employee. 
3. Robust t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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